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SELECTED LEGAL CHALLENGES RELATING TO THE MILITARY USE OF 




In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 1960, the 
then President of the United States of America, Dwight Eisenhower, stated that: 
The emergence of this new world [outer space] poses a vital issue: will outer space 
be preserved for peaceful use and developed for the benefit of all mankind? Or will 
it become another focus for the arms race and thus an area of dangerous and sterile 
competition? The choice is urgent. And it is ours to make. The nations of the world 
have recently united in declaring the continent of Antarctica off limits to military 
preparations. We could extend this principle to an even more important sphere. 
National vested interests have not yet been developed in space or in celestial bodies. 
Barriers to agreement are now lower than they will ever be again. The opportunity 
may be fleeting. Before many years have passed, the point of no return may have 
passed.1 
Although the race to the moon dominated the attention of the two major space 
powers, the (then) USSR and the USA, during the 1960s,2 the potential use of space 
for military purposes has continued to be intrinsically linked to the development of 
space technology3 and space flight4 since the end of the Second World War. 
The launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, by the USSR in 1957 "caused a 
crisis in Western military thinking"5 as it indicated that a surprise attack from space 
was a real possibility. This event was the impetus for the so-called "space race" 
between the USA and the USSR, causing these two world powers to invest huge 
                                        
  Anél Ferreira-Snyman. B Juris (PUCHE); LLB (PUCHE); LLM (PUCHE); LLD (UJ). Professor, School 
of Law, Unisa. E-mail: ferremp@unisa.ac.za. Most of the research for this article was conducted in 
April/May 2013 by utilizing the research collection of the Institute for Air and Space Law at the 
University of Leiden. The research was undertaken with a research grant awarded by the College 
Research and Innovation Committee of the College of Law at Unisa. 
1  See Eisenhower 1960 http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207330.htm. 
2  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 508. See Mayer "Short Chronology of Spaceflight" 23-24 for a short 
description of the quest for the moon during the 1960s. 
3  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 499, 508.  
4  Soucek "Earth Observation" 116. Neger and Soucek "Space Faring" 158 point out that "military 
aspects were the basis of modern spaceflight". 
5  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 507. 
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resources in their respective space programmes.6 Apart from the development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could be used for the launching of nuclear 
warheads,7 specifically the strategic benefit of earth observation from outer space 
(reconnaissance) was and still is seen as an important security tool for states.8 
Especially during the 1980s and continuing until the end of the Cold War, efforts were 
made to militarise outer space, for example, in the form of the ASM-135 Anti-Satellite 
Missile, which was developed and tested by the US Air Force in 1985 under the 
proposed missile defence programme.9 During the 1980s Israel set up its military 
space programme and assisted South Africa to develop its own.10 
The 1991 Gulf War provided the impetus for the use of military space applications 
such as American and British communications, reconnaissance and early-warning 
satellites, which played an indispensable role in the military operations during this 
conflict.11 The USA has on several occasions reiterated that it is prepared to engage 
in armed conflict from space with statements such as the following: 
It's politically sensitive, but it's going to happen. Some people don't want to hear this, 
and it sure isn't vogue, but – absolutely – we're going to fight in space. We're going 
to fight from space and we're going to fight into space. That's why the US has 
developed programs in directed energy and hit-to-kill mechanisms. We will engage 
terrestrial targets someday – ships, airplanes, land targets – from space.12 
The USA regards outer space as a top national security interest to which its military 
power should be extended by, for example, the possible deployment of non-nuclear 
space-based weaponry.13 Especially since the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 
                                        
6  Neger and Soucek "Space Faring" 157. 
7  Neger and Soucek "Space Faring" 158. 
8  Soucek "Earth Observation" 116-117.  
9  Mayer "Short Chronology of Spaceflight" 24-25. 
10  Mayer "Short Chronology of Spaceflight" 24-25. 
11  Mayer "Short Chronology of Spaceflight" 25. 
12  Ashy JW, Commander and Chief of the United States Space Command, Aviation Week and Space 
Technology (9 August 1995) as quoted in Shah 2007 http://www.globalissues.org/ 
article/69/militarization-and-weaponization-of-outer-space. 
13  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 511-512; Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 108. In this regard 
Goodman refers to the 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security 
Space Management and Organisation (Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organisation 2001 http www.dod.gov/space20010111.html), which cautions in 
ch 2 that the USA is "an attractive candidate for a 'Space Pearl Harbor'" and that it must therefore 
reduce its space vulnerability.  
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September 2001, resulting in the "War on Terror", policies concerning space-based 
weapons have again been placed on the military agenda of the USA.14 
As Venet15 points out, outer space activities have a clear political dimension. During 
the Cold War space activities were intrinsically linked to the political objectives, 
priorities and national security concerns of the two superpowers, the USA and the 
Soviet Union.16 After the Cold War the political relevance and benefits of space 
continued to be recognised by states not only as a foreign policy tool to affirm their 
sovereignty17 and increase their power on the international level, but also to solve 
domestic and transnational problems.18 
In view of the recent emergence of new major space powers, such as China,19 the 
focus has again shifted to the military use of outer space and the potential that a state 
with advanced space technology may use it for military purposes in order to dominate 
other states.20 This has already been illustrated, when China in January 2007 "shocked 
the international community"21 by performing an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test which 
generated a vast amount of space debris in low earth orbit.22 
                                        
14  Shah 2007 http://www.globalissues.org/article/69/militarization-and-weaponization-of-outer-
space.  
15  Venet "Political Dimension" 73. 
16  Venet "Political Dimension" 73-74. 
17  Venet "Political Dimension" 79. An example in this regard is China with the rapid development of 
its space programme. 
18  Venet "Political Dimension" 75-76. 
19  See Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 12-15. 
20  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 499, 508. In this regard Soucek "International Law" 318 refers to the 
doctrine of space control as one of the purposes of space capacities identified by the US Space 
Command. Soucek points out that, although the idea of space superiority is in itself a legitimate 
goal, the doctrine of space control may be contrary to the provision in a 1 of the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1969) (Outer Space Treaty) that all states should be free to 
use and explore outer space. He explains as follows: "Space control has four key aspects: 
surveillance, protection, prevention and negation. The problem lies in the last of the four: Space 
control wants to limit the space freedoms if unilaterally found necessary (applying upon 
occurrence, ie during a military conflict). The doctrine of space control requires capacities and 
methods; much of it sounds like Star Wars turned true: anti-satellite weapons, space mines, 
bodyguard satellites, high altitude nuclear detonations, etc. The focus of the doctrines of space 
superiority and space control is ultimately to achieve national goals through a dominant use of 
outer space in comparison to adversaries." 
21  Remuss "Space and Security" 519. 
22  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365; Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 15. For further 
examples of recent developments towards space militarisation, see Gopalakrishan, Murthi and 
Prasad 2008 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 254. 
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As will be further discussed below, the Outer Space Treaty23 prohibits the installation 
of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space and determines 
that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only.24 
Although the installation and testing of military equipment and space weapons in outer 
space is clearly unlawful, the problem remains that most space assets have the 
potential to be used for military purposes.25 For example, while satellite technology in 
the form of remote sensing can be used to gather meteorological data, it can also be 
used to gather intelligence in other states. Similarly, Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS) or Global Position Systems (GPS) can be used for civilian purposes, 
but also to direct bombs or cruise missiles.26 Telecommunication satellites are used to 
transmit not only civilian communications but also military messages.27 Remote 
sensing by means of satellite is also used in the civilian as well as military spheres.28 
It is clear that the distinction between military and non-military uses of space, is 
becoming increasingly blurred.29 The question therefore remains whether the military 
use of space equipment is contrary to the provision in the Outer Space Treaty that 
outer space must be used for peaceful purposes exclusively. Moreover, due to the 
importance for states to protect their space assets from possible neutralisation by 
other states, the potential for conflict is self-evident.30 In this regard Goodman31 aptly 
notes: 
                                        
23  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1969) (Outer Space Treaty). 
24 A IV of the Outer Space Treaty. 
25  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 500. Also see Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 108, who confirms 
that "[i]t is widely known that any object in space can become a space weapon". 
26  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 500, 519. The authors point out that "the present operation systems, 
US GPS, Russian GLONASS and the Chinese Beidou are systems designed, operated and owned 
by the military to which civilians have been granted access" (Lyall and Larsen Space Law 519). 
Also see Frischauf "Satellite Navigation" 126-133 on the dual use of satellite navigation systems. 
27  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 500. The use of telecommunications systems is subject to the rules 
and procedures of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). See further in this regard 
Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
28  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 521-522. Also see Soucek "International Law" 317; Ospina 2009 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 178. 
29  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 519; Ospina 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space 
Law 180. 
30  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 110. 
31  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 111. 
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As space assets become increasingly integrated into national and economic systems 
and military defences, space will become an increasingly attractive battleground. 
2 Delimiting outer space  
Since some military activities which are permitted on earth, may be prohibited in outer 
space, it is necessary to know where outer space is. The term outer space generally 
refers to the entire universe, in other words, any area beyond the earth's atmosphere. 
However, since spaceflight can be undertaken only in a very limited part of outer 
space, this general meaning is too broad for legal purposes. In a legal sense, outer 
space refers to that part of the universe where human activities are practically possible 
or feasible.32 Some activities which are based on earth are, however, intrinsically linked 
to outer space activities and the question remains whether space law should be 
applicable to these activities also.33  
The delimitation of outer space essentially concerns the question of where air space 
ends and where outer space begins. The answer to this question is significant in order 
to determine which activities are indeed space activities under international space law, 
and which activities are governed by other legal regimes. In contrast to air space, 
which falls under the territorial sovereignty of the underlying state, international law 
determines that outer space is not subject to the sovereignty of any particular state.34 
It may therefore be regarded as customary international law that states do not need 
the prior consent of other states in order to conduct activities in outer space.35 
                                        
32  Neger and Walter "Space Law" 238. 
33  Neger and Walter "Space Law" 238-239. According to the authors these activities include those 
which "can be considered as facilitating access to and the return from outer space, like all kinds 
of launching and return facilities (spaceports as well as spacecrafts)" and those activities which 
"regulate the operation and control of human conduct in outer space, like all activities concerning 
the functioning of satellites and other outer space systems (eg ISS)" (Neger and Walter "Space 
Law" 239). 
34  Neger and Walter "Space Law" 239. 
35  In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v Netherlands), Merits, 1969 ICJ Reports 3 230 it was stated by Lachs J that 
"[t]he first instruments that man sent into outer space traversed the airspace of States and circled 
above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, not did the States 
protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came to be established 
and recognized as law within a remarkably short period of time". Also see Freeland 2010 Melb J 
Int'l L 10-11. 
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Clear international consensus on the definition of outer space has, however, not yet 
been reached.36 An attempt to formally define the term can be found in the first Draft 
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, which was developed by two 
major space superpowers, China and Russia, and presented in 2008 at the Plenary 
Meeting of the United Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.37 Article 1(a) defined 
outer space as the "space beyond the elevation of approximately 100km above ocean 
level of the Earth". The use of the word approximately, however, resulted in the 
definition lacking a clear and decisive indication of the borderline between air space 
and outer space.38 The "disputable definition"39 was therefore removed from the 
second draft of the Treaty40 in order "to be addressed, if necessary, in the future".41 
The failure of the drafters of the Draft Treaty to formulate a clear definition of outer 
space is regrettable. It is not clear how outer space activities can be regulated in terms 
of the Draft Treaty without a clear indication of what it regards as the borderline 
between earth and outer space.  
Although some commentators are of the opinion that the demarcation of outer space 
would be premature or even unnecessary, the need for a well-defined border line in 
order to avoid uncertainties and conflict situations is self-evident.42 At present it is 
                                        
36  Freeland 2010 Melb J Int'l L 12. 
37  Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or 
Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (2008) available at Reaching Critical Will 2014 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space. Also see 
Masson-Zwaan and Freeland 2010 Acta Astronautica 1603; Freeland 2010 Melb J Int'l L 12-13. 
38  Freeland 2010 Melb J Int'l L 12-13. 
39  See the Explanatory Note on the updated Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2014) 
available at Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
40  The second draft of the Treaty was recently submitted by Russia and China to the Conference on 
Disarmament in June 2014. See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2014) available at 
Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
41  See the Explanatory Note on the updated Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Spaceand of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects available 
at Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
42  Diederiks-Verschoor Introduction to Space Law 15. Cheng 1995 Air and Space Law 298 identifies 
three schools of thought on the delimitation and definition of outer space: (i) The spatialists who 
assert that there should logically be a legally determined delimitation of the end of national air 
space and the beginning of outer space. (ii) The functionalists who argue against the need for 
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accepted, as a matter of customary international law, that the altitude of 100 
kilometers above sea level (the so-called Von Kármán line43) can be considered as the 
legally relevant "edge of space".44 This means that activities executed and objects 
placed beyond 100 kilometers above sea level, are space activities and space objects. 
Although this delimitation continues to be debated in theory and may constantly vary 
as a result of new technology, states often in practice refer to this boundary in their 
national legislation to distinguish activities and objects which fall under their national 
air laws from others.45 In order to ensure that outer space is indeed used for peaceful 
purposes as envisaged by the Outer Space Treaty, it is imperative that states reach 
clear consensus on "the vertical limit of State sovereignty"46 as a matter of urgency.47 
3 Use of force in international law 
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty determines that states parties to the Treaty shall 
carry out their activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance with 
international law, including the Charter, in the interest of maintaining international 
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. A 
discussion of the military use of outer space must therefore necessarily be done with 
(brief) reference to general international law rules on the use of force.48 
                                        
such delimitation, as the lawfulness or unlawfulness of space activities should, according to them, 
be determined solely by the nature of the activity or the vehicle. (iii) The you-don't-need-to-know 
school who also finds it unnecessary to determine the border between air space and outer space.  
43  See further Neger and Walter "Space Law" 240. Lyall and Larsen Space Law 167-168; Diederiks-
Verschoor Introduction to Space Law 17. 
44  Neger and Walter "Space Law" 240-241. Also see Diederiks-Verschoor Introduction to Space Law 
19-20. Cheng 1995 Air and Space Law 299 explains that "[i]n absolute terms, this point may be 
put 94 km from the surface of the earth. Conservatively, the figure may be put at 100 or 110 km". 
He also points out that states may, as they have done with regard to the delimitation of the 
territorial sea, decide to claim a higher or lower limit, or tacitly or expressly agree on a specific 
border separating national air space from outer space. 
45  Neger and Walter "Space Law" 241. South Africa's Space Affairs Act 84 of 1993 defines outer space 
in s 1(xv) as "the space above the surface of the earth from the height at which it is in practice 
possible to operate an object in an orbit around the earth". 
46  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 112.  
47  Also see Lyall and Larsen Space Law 499-500. 
48  See further Lyall and Larsen Space Law 501-506 for a concise discussion of the use of force in 
general international law. In contrast with Lyall and Larsen Space Law 59 who state that it is a 
fundamental principle that "international law applies to outer space", Soucek "International Law" 
321 prefers the formulation that "[i]nternational law applies to human activities in outer space". 
He explains that the latter formulation would avoid the perception that "human rules of law stretch 
across the universe. The universe adopts the laws of gravity and relativity, but not international 
law. States however have to obey, and this stretches as far as they go into outer space". 
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The maintenance of international peace and security is one of the main objectives of 
the United Nations and member states are therefore required to settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means.49 Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations stipulates that all member states shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state. The Charter recognises the right to resort to force in only two instances: 
first, under the authority of the Security Council,50 and second, when states exercise 
the right of individual or collective self-defence in terms of Article 51. The prohibition 
on the unauthorised use of force is widely regarded as a rule of customary 
international law.  
4 Military use51 of outer space 
As has already been mentioned above, outer space has been, and will continue to be, 
of strategic and military importance to states.52 It has even been contended 
unequivocally by some that: 
Space has always been militarised. Military considerations were at the heart of the 
original efforts to enter space and have remained so to the present day.53 
Although it could conversely be argued that not all space activities have a purely 
military purpose, it still holds true that many of these activities at least serve a direct 
or indirect military interest,54 especially in view of the dual-use character of space 
technologies.55 At the time of the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty, both the 
USSR and the USA already had military satellites in orbit and their rejection of any 
                                        
49  See aa 1 and 2(3) of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) (UN Charter).  
50  The Security Council may take action under ch VII of the UN Charter if it determines that a 
particular situation constitutes a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" 
in terms of a 39 of the Charter. Should this be the case, the Security Council can take appropriate 
measures as provided for in aa 40, 41 or 42 of the Charter. 
51  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 514 list the following aspects of the military use of outer space: "[T]he 
employment of military personnel and equipment; the passive or non-aggressive use of outer 
space; the use of civilian space systems for military purposes; the use of weapons in space; the 
incursion into space of military weapons; the interference with space located equipment from 
space; the interference with space located equipment from Earth." 
52  Soucek "International Law" 318. 
53  Sheehan International Politics of Space 2 as quoted in Soucek "International Law" 317. 
54  Soucek "International Law" 317. 
55  Soucek "International Law" 318. Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365 points out that the number 
of states using dual-use satellites is increasing. 
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limitation of their use of satellites for military purposes prevented a total ban on all 
military activities in outer space.56 
As a result, in contrast with the Antarctic Treaty57 which prohibits "any measure of a 
military nature",58 article IV of the Outer Space Treaty determines as follows: 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, 
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in 
any other manner. The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States 
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military 
bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the 
conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of 
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not 
be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration 
of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.59 
From the reading of article IV, the following issues present a number of legal 
challenges which deserve further attention. 
4.1 Peaceful purposes 
In keeping with the terminology employed by the UN Charter, requiring that states 
settle their disputes by peaceful means, article IV of the Outer Space Treaty stipulates 
that outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes exclusively.60 The term peaceful 
is not defined by the Outer Space Treaty, however, and it is consequently not 
completely clear which activities would be considered as peaceful uses of outer 
space.61 In addition, depending on an expansive or a restrictive interpretation of article 
                                        
56  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 513. 
57  Antarctic Treaty (1959), adopted in Washington DC, the United States of America on 1 December 
1959. 
58  A 1 of the Antarctic Treaty (1959). 
59  Apart from the Outer Space Treaty, a number of other treaties, declarations and resolutions also 
deal with the peaceful uses of outer space. For a further discussion on these instruments see Lyall 
and Larsen Space Law 511; Remuss "Space and Security" 520-525. 
60  Soucek "International Law" 320 points out that the primary concern of the Outer Space Treaty, 
namely the promotion of peace, is echoed by a number of provisions in the Treaty, for example, 
a III, which determines that states parties must carry out their outer space activities in the interest 
of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and 
understanding. 
61  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 524; Soucek "International Law" 320. 
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IV, one may argue that the enumerated prohibitions are either a closed list, or merely 
examples of the type of activities that may be prohibited in outer space.62 
According to the interpretation of the USA and other Western states, the term peaceful 
means non-aggressive.63 As Lyall and Larsen64 point out, this interpretation is in 
accordance with the distinction by the UN Charter between the pacific settlement of 
disputes under Chapter VI and actions under Chapter VII in instances of threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. It is not clear, however, if the 
use of satellites during military conflict for purposes such as mapping, weather 
navigation, early warning and reconnaissance could be regarded as an aggressive use 
of space and thus contrary to the Outer Space Treaty.65 
Based on an inclusive reading of the Outer Space Treaty, especially taking into account 
the provision that the use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all 
mankind,66 some authors argue that the term peaceful must rather be interpreted to 
mean non-military, thereby prohibiting all military uses of outer space.67 However, as 
Bourbonnièrre and Lee68 point out, this interpretation is not reflected in the practice 
of states, which includes the placement of military or dual-use communications and 
remote sensing satellites in orbit around the earth. Moreover, since the lawfulness of 
the use of dual purpose technologies in outer space has been generally accepted since 
the beginning of the space era, an attempt to prohibit it now would in all probability 
                                        
62  Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L supports a narrow definition of peaceful purposes in order to mitigate the 
potential of space weaponisation. See further in this regard Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 880-
881. They note, however, that "states are generally reluctant to give expansive interpretations to 
normative dispositions that could restrict their scope or freedom of action on issues of national 
security" (Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 881).  
63  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 524. Also see Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 260-265. 
64  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 524. 
65  Golroo and Bahrami 2008 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 247. With 
reference to the argument by Cheng Studies in International Space Law 515, Friman 2005 FYBIL 
finds that peaceful purposes cannot merely be defined as "non-aggressive".  
66  A 1 of the Outer Space Treaty. 
67  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 524. 
68  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 877. 
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be a futile exercise.69 The fact remains, however, that dual-use technology may be 
modified to threaten or destroy the space assets of other states.70 
Also the fact that the Outer Space Treaty allows for the use of military personnel in 
outer space for scientific research or any other peaceful purposes, seems to suggest 
that the interpretation of peaceful as meaning the completely non-military use of outer 
space would be too broad for the purposes of the Outer Space Treaty. The wording 
"scientific research or any other peaceful purposes" implies that scientific research, 
even though it is conducted by military personnel, is regarded as a peaceful use of 
outer space. It has therefore been noted that the prohibitions in article IV do not 
prevent the development of military technologies.71 However, if the results of the 
scientific research are to be employed for non-peaceful purposes, it is doubtful 
whether the research activities would fall within the meaning of peaceful purposes in 
terms of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Due to the shortcomings of defining "peaceful" as meaning either non-aggressive or 
non-military, Friman72 proposes that a concilliatory approach should be followed in 
redefining the term "peaceful" in order to comply with the object and purpose of the 
Outer Space Treaty, which is "to safeguard the exploration and use of outer space as 
a perpetual and peaceful province of all mankind".73 She consequently concludes that 
all lawful non-military uses of outer space would be regarded as peaceful, while 
military uses of outer space will be considered to be peaceful only if they meet certain 
treaty-based criteria.74 Since the weaponisation of outer space would fail to meet most 
                                        
69  Friman 2005 FYBIL 293. Also Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 884 points out that "space powers have 
determined that military support activities such as observation, surveillance, communications, and 
the detection of nuclear explosions on Earth, are 'passive' and thus fall under the umbrella of 
'peaceful purposes'". 
70  Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 886. 
71  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 517. 
72  Friman 2005 FYBIL 304, 310. 
73  Friman 2005 FYBIL 302-303. 
74  Friman 2005 FYBIL 303-304 lists these criteria as follows: "Under the proposed reconciling 
approach, all lawful non-military purposes would thus be peaceful, whereas military purposes 
would be peaceful only if they: 1) are for the benefit and in the common interest of all mankind 
(Article I of the Outer Space Treaty); 2) do not restrict the freedom of exploration and use of outer 
space by all states (Article I of the Outer Space Treaty); 3) are compatible with international law, 
including the UN Charter (Article III of the Outer Space Treaty); 4) serve the maintenance of 
international peace and security (Article III of the Outer Space Treaty); 5) promote international 
cooperation and understanding (Article III of the Outer Space Treaty); 6) do not inequitably exploit 
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of these criteria it would, according to Friman,75 constitute an unlawful use of outer 
space. Although it is agreed with Friman that the object and purpose of the Outer 
Space Treaty should provide the benchmark against which the military action should 
be measured to determine whether it may be deemed "peaceful" or not, the problem 
remains that some of the criteria identified by Friman76 are in themselves not clear. 
For example, it is not clear whether action taken in self-defence would be compatible 
with the maintenance of international peace and security as determined in article III 
of the Outer Space Treaty.77  
4.2 Militarisation versus weaponisation 
From the above discussion, it seems that article IV does not place an unqualified ban 
on military activities in outer space, but that it limits certain military activities.78 A 
distinction should therefore be drawn between the militarisation and the 
weaponisation79 of outer space. 
In terms of a strict interpretation of the peaceful principle in article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty, the non-militarisation (or demilitarisation80) of outer space would mean 
"the prohibition of using space-based facilities for any military purpose".81 However, 
Su82 points out that state practice indicates that states have not followed this strict 
interpretation of the non-militarisation of outer space and that outer space was in fact 
militarised since the launch of the first communication satellites. The militarisation of 
outer space may therefore be described as the passive military use of outer space. 
                                        
outer space, but have due regard for the corresponding interests of other states (Article IX of the 
Outer Space Treaty); and 7) do not subject outer void space or the celestial bodies to national 
appropriation (Article II of the Outer Space Treaty)." 
75  Friman 2005 FYBIL 310. 
76  Friman 2005 FYBIL 303-304. 
77  The issue of self-defence in outer space is addressed further here below.  
78  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 514; Soucek "International Law" 320. 
79  In addition to the terms militarisation and weaponisation, Friman 2005 FYBIL 290-291 also employs 
the term neutralisation, which is defined as "the process whereby a space is excluded from the 
theatre of war and armed conflict". According to Friman it is clear that all celestial bodies are 
neutralised under article IV, as its wording clearly prohibits any use which has the immediate or 
ultimate aim of warfare. 
80  Friman 2005 FYBIL 290 defines demilitarisation as "the process whereby all forms of military 
methods, forces and resources are barred from space". 
81  Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 255.  
82  Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 255. 
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Activities such as reconnaissance and surveillance, which are currently performed by 
a number of states, may thus be described as militarising outer space. Based on the 
perceived non-aggressive nature of these activities, such activities are accepted as 
legal by the large majority of states and thus as not contrary to article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter.83 Su84 therefore submits that: 
On account of the contribution of passive military uses of outer space to international 
peace and security, and the interconnection between military activities in outer space 
and those on earth, demilitarisation of outer space is unlikely.85 
Thus, ironically, military uses of outer space which are in fact not really peaceful (such 
as the use of satellites to direct bombing raids) are currently accepted by states.86 
Ultimately, the lawfulness of these passive military uses of outer space will have to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis87 by, for example, referring to the main purpose 
of the space object.88 
The weaponisation of outer space may be described as "the deployment of weapons 
of an offensive nature in outer space or on the ground with their intended target 
located in space".89 The large majority of states regard these activities as illegal since 
they are contrary to the basic principles of public international and outer space law.90 
Although outer space is currently not weaponised by any state,91 recent activities such 
                                        
83  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364; Ospina 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of 
Space Law 184; Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 25. Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 
258 points out that even activities such as espionage, which are disliked by many states, are 
seldom protested about. Also see Christol 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space 
Law 106. 
84  Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 259. 
85  In a similar vein, Friman 2005 FYBIL 291 states that "[o]uter void space is already militarised by 
both military and non-military space assets. Demilitarizing outer void space would necessitate a 
ban on, inter alia, reconnaissance, surveillance, and communication assets since these may be of 
a 'dual use' that is exploited for both military and non-military purposes. Seeing as it is virtually 
impossible to discriminate between the peaceful and non-peaceful military exploitation of the 
advantages gained by such dual use space assets, the boundary between partial and total 
militarization of outer void space is obscure at best".  
86  Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
87  Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 259.  
88  Ospina 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 184, fn 1. 
89  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364-365. 
90  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365.  
91  Park 2006 Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 873 states that "[w]hile the realm of outer space may be heavily 
militarized, it is not yet weaponized". He explains this statement as follows: "In other words, 
although space-based devices such as satellites may be used for aggressive military measures, 
they lack direct destructive capacity and thus are not considered to be space weapons." 
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as the ASAT test by China, the suspected pursuance of similar capabilities by other 
states,92 and the vulnerability of space systems to cyber attacks have created 
international fear that the weaponisation of space is a real possibility,93 with obvious 
implications for space security.94 Such threats may include the destruction of satellites 
by anti-satellite weapons, the rendering of satellites as temporarily inoperable through 
jamming or cyber-attacks, as well as the mere placement of offensive or defensive 
weapons in outer space, regardless of whether they are eventually used or not.95 
Some experts also argue that weapons that travel through outer space in order to 
reach their targets (such as hypersonic technology vehicles) also add to the 
weaponisation of outer space.96 Due to the generation of vast amounts of space debris 
it generates, the mere testing of space weapons already poses a risk to space security 
and to the right of other states to use and explore outer space freely.97 
Apart from states, the space arena has evolved to increasingly including non-state 
entities, which are becoming serious actors in outer space activities themselves.98 
Although the commercialisation of outer space has a number of advantages, it may 
                                        
92  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365 points out that, apart from China, ASAT weapon tests have 
previously also been performed by the USA and then USSR. According to Tronchetti, it is also 
suspected that France and India are currently pursuing such capabilities. Lyall and Larsen Space 
Law 525 describes the four basic modes of anti-satellite technology as follows: "A kinetic weapon 
destroys and cripples a satellite by collision with either a single missile, or with a number of small 
objects towards it – the buckshot technique. Launched from the Earth or from a space platform, 
a kinetic weapon would have the disadvantage of producing a cloud of debris, with all its potential 
consequences. An alternative is the laser which could be used to knock out a satellite, again from 
either Earth or from space. A different possibility is the use of radio jamming to either overwhelm 
a satellite itself or to prevent its signals being used. Last, in a modern age dependent on electronics 
and the Internet, a less obvious but real possibility is cyber-attack on a perceived enemy, part of 
which could involve interference with command, control and use of satellite systems." 
93  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365. Also see Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 265 for a discussion 
of the possible weaponisation of outer space by the United States of America. 
94  See Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365-366. Tronchetti states that "[i]n the realm of outer space, 
the idea of security refers to the absence of manmade or natural threats to space assets". Threats 
to space assets are divided into unintentional and intentional threats. The former include threats 
arising from space weather, space debris and malfunctioning, while the latter include 
"premeditated attacks targeting space objects or their respective ground stations" (Tronchetti "Soft 
Law Approach" 366). Tronchetti interprets the concept space security in a restrictive manner as 
the "absence of intentional threats to space objects, specifically those causing their physical 
destruction" (Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 366). Also see Remuss "Space and Security" 519. 
95  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 366. See further Reaching Critical Will 2014 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space. 
96  See further Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
97  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 362. 
98  Hofmann 2007 SAYIL 233. Also see Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 109. 
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also bring with it certain threats to space security.99 In this regard Goodman100 
cautions that, even though it is not yet a commonly predicted threat, the possibility of 
space terrorism should not be overlooked. According to Goodman,101 the threat posed 
by space terrorism could be much graver than any terrorist acts already known to the 
world. Therefore, control of private space actors, may eventually become a matter of 
national (and even international) security.102 
Specifically satellite technology is an attractive target for space terrorists, as 
interference with a state's satellites could disrupt military operations and essential 
daily activities such as financial transactions and telecommunications.103 These 
possible attacks will increasingly provide the incentive for states to develop the ability 
not only to protect their own space assets but also to neutralise the space assets of 
their enemies.104 
This leads to the question whether the right to self-defence may be exercised by states 
in order to protect their assets in outer space. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
makes provision for the inherent right to self-defence of all states and reads as follows: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right to self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
In the instance of anticipatory self-defence, an armed attack has not yet occurred, but 
the defensive action is taken in anticipation of an armed attack. The attack must, 
however, be imminent, and the defensive action must be proportionate to the 
anticipated attack.105 Although there is divided opinion amongst scholars on whether 
                                        
99  In this regard Park 2006 Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L points out that commercial entities have enjoyed 
a certain degree of independence in their space activities, which complicates the space security 
regime. 
100  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 110. 
101  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 110. 
102  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 109. 
103  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 110-111. 
104  Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 111.  
105  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 504-505; Dugard International Law 500. 
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article 51 allows for anticipatory self-defence, states have invoked such action on a 
number of occasions.106 Recently a "wider notion of self-defence"107 called pre-emptive 
self-defence emerged in the practice of states. In this instance a state will act pre-
emptively due to the mere possibility of being attacked. The United States under the 
Bush administration justified this form of self-defence as a means to counter potential 
terrorist attacks and the use of weapons of mass destruction.108 Although the 
International Court of Justice determined that states could not act in self-defence 
based on believing attacks to be likely or on wishing to protect perceived security 
interests,109 there is still a real concern that states may militarise outer space as a pre-
emptive measure,110 even more so in view of the potential risk of space terrorism.111 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter requires that self-defence measures must be 
immediately reported to the Security Council, which may take action it deems 
necessary to restore international peace and security. The question arises, however, 
whether the Security Council may take or authorise military action which may be 
prohibited in terms of the space law proscription in article IV that outer space may be 
used for peaceful purposes only.112 
According to Bourbonnière and Lee,113 article IV of the Outer Space Treaty should be 
interpreted in the context of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, since article 
103 of the Charter provides that 
                                        
106  See further Dugard International Law 501-502. 
107  Dugard International Law 502. 
108  Dugard International Law 502. 
109  See in this regard Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 2004 ICJ Reports 136 para 139; Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo 2005 ICJ 
Reports 168 paras 143, 148. Also see Dugard International Law 502-503. 
110  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 506. 
111  Dugard International Law 506 points out that although the International Court of Justice has been 
reluctant to extend a 51 to also cover self defence against attacks by non-state actors, there is 
nothing in a 51 that indicates that the right to self-defence may be invoked only after an attack by 
a state. However, he cautions that "[t]errorism is a serious threat to the international peace and 
security, but it is one that must be contained and confronted by multilateral action under the 
auspices of the Security Council and not by unilateral action under the guise of self-defence". Also 
see the discussion by Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 889 on the deployment of conventional 
weapons in outer space by private actors. 
112  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 506. 
113  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 878. 
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[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.114 
Consequently, Bourbonnière and Lee115 argue that the obligations in the United 
Nations Charter would prevail over any of the rights and obligations in the Outer Space 
Treaty. As was pointed out earlier, article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations 
stipulates that all member states shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
other state. According to Bourbonnière and Lee116 an obligation to use force arises 
under article 42 of the Charter as states are under an obligation to abide by the 
decisions of the Security Council, including a decision to "take such action by air, sea 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security". The authors therefore submit that 
[t]o the extent that Article IV of the Outer Space treaty does not constitute jus 
cogens, a decision made by the Security Council to use military force in outer space 
would prevail over any prohibitions or obligations under Article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty.117 
Since the right to self-defence is formulated as a right instead of an obligation, article 
103 of the Charter would, according to Bourbonnière and Lee's construction here 
above, not apply to article 51. Hence, in terms of the general rule regarding the 
application of successive treaties, which determines that later treaties prevail over 
earlier ones,118 the prohibitions in article IV of the Outer Space Treaty would prevail.119 
However, Bourbonnière and Lee120 argue that, based on the wording "inherent right" 
in article 51, the right to self-defence has attained the status of jus cogens and 
therefore prevails over article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (unless it is in itself a jus 
                                        
114  A 30(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) subjects the general rule regarding 
the application of successive treaties, which determines that later treaties prevail over earlier ones, 
to a 103 of the UN Charter.  
115  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 878. 
116  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 878-879. 
117  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 879. 
118  See aa 30(1)-(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
119  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 879 explain as follows: "In this context, the prohibitions in Article 
IV of the Outer Space Treaty would arguably prevail in all circumstances except where the Security 
Council decided expressly or impliedly that military action, including the deployment and the use 
of force in contravention of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, was sanctioned in terms of Article 
51." 
120  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 879-880. 
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cogens norm.)121 Therefore, according to the authors, in the case of the lawful use of 
force under articles 42 and 51 of the Charter, states would not be bound by the 
prohibitions in article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, including the prohibitions on the 
deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and the 
construction of military installations on the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Conversely, in the case of the unlawful use of force in the form of aggression, article 
IV of the Outer Space Treaty would, according to Bourbonnière and Lee,122 prevail. 
The authors' viewpoint gives rise to a number of concerns: First, the assertion that 
article 51 has attained the status of jus cogens has not been unequivocally established 
in international law. Second, if one accepts that both article 51 of the Charter and 
article IV of the Outer Space Treaty are jus cogens norms, the question immediately 
arises how these competing norms should be balanced.123 Third, the authors 
seemingly argue that the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction, and the construction of military installations on the moon and other 
celestial bodies, would form part of the lawful use of force in terms of articles 41 and 
52 of the Charter. In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons,124 the International Court of Justice did not conclusively answer the 
question whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was prohibited in all 
circumstances.125 The court however inter alia decided unanimously that 
[a] threat or use of nuclear weapons should be compatible with the requirements of 
the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles 
and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with the specific obligations 
under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons 
…126 
In view of this statement by the court, it is submitted that a threat or use of nuclear 
weapons in outer space (even in the instance of self-defence) would not be compatible 
with article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which expressly prohibits the use of nuclear 
                                        
121  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 880 point out that if art IV of the Outer Space Treaty also has 
the status of a jus cogens norm, "the right to individual and collective self-defence could perhaps 
conceivably be confined by its terms".  
122  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 880.  
123  As Moussa 2008 IRRC 973 points out, there is seemingly no clear answer to this question in 
international law. 
124  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226. 
125  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226 266-267. 
126  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226 266. My emphasis. 
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weapons in outer space. It is furthermore difficult to conceive of the use of nuclear 
weapons in outer space, in the light of the current nuclear disarmament efforts by 
states.127 
Lyall and Larsen128 also reach the conclusion that the right to self-defence applies to 
outer space, but they hold a more cautionary viewpoint. They also motivate their 
viewpoint with reference to article 30(1) of the Vienna Convention, which subjects the 
general rule regarding the application of successive treaties to article 103 of the United 
Nations Charter, and argue that a state would be permitted to act in self-defence in 
order to defend its personnel and space technologies if the action taken is within the 
boundaries set by article 51 of the Charter.129 This includes that the defence must be 
proportionate to the attack.130 They therefore caution that: 
Precision weapons should be used properly, 'harmful interference' with the activities 
of others be avoided as far as possible, and the creation of debris should be minimised 
in the general interest.131 
The authors furthermore point out that the decision to act in self-defence is 
complicated by the speed and density of modern communications. As a result, a swift 
military decision needs to be taken by a state132 by relying on conflicting data which 
may be received simultaneously. Moreover, an act of self-defence by one state may 
lead to other states taking responsive action, which will inevitably result in the 
                                        
127  See further Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space on the effects of the weaponisation of outer space on arms control and 
nuclear disarmament. 
128  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 526. 
129  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 503-504. 
130  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 504. 
131  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 527. In this regard Duberti 2011 Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Outer Space Law 86 argues that, due to the grave effects of space debris, the 
destruction of a satellite should be regarded as unlawful. He therefore suggests that in exercising 
its legitimate right of self-defence, a state may attack a satellite that was used for military purposes 
by another state by using technical means that would merely complicate or disable its operation. 
132  According to Christol 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 106, the 
possession of nuclear weapons in the case of an identified threat would justify a more immediate 
response than occurred in the Caroline incident. Consequently, the limits on the use of force as 
prescribed in the Caroline case would not be applicable in the event of such a threat. He asserts 
that "[t]he magnitude of the probable harm and the resultant shortness of time within which a 
responsive decision would have to be taken would require extreme protective measures owing to 
the threat produced by such weapons". 
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undermining of international peace and security.133 Lyall and Larsen134 therefore 
caution that states should be reluctant to engage in pre-emptive self-defence in outer 
space. 
This cautionary statement by the authors should also be extended to anticipatory self-
defence, as it would be difficult to reconcile the potential ongoing damage caused by 
space debris as the aftermath of the defensive action with the proportionality 
principle.135 In a contribution on the environmental dimension of space arms control, 
Su and Zhu136 point out that the space environment is significantly more fragile than 
earth due to its "poor capability of regeneration" and that the "overproliferation of 
space debris would render the Earth orbit unusable" for future generations.137 They 
therefore regard a weapons-free outer space (which would include the banning of the 
testing, deployment and use of space-based weapons and ASATs) as a prerequisite 
for the sustainable use of outer space.138 
Due to the legal uncertainties relating to the use and control of the right to self-
defence in outer space, the submission by Filho139 that this right should preferably not 
be used in outer space and that states should reach an agreement to ban preventative 
or pre-emptive self-defence in outer space is supported. The grave consequences that 
the application of the right to self-defence may have in outer space require a sui 
                                        
133  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 528. 
134  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 528. 
135  As Filho 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 482 points out, "it is 
practically impossible [to] make a proportional defense without knowing yet which and how will 
be the presumed attack". Also Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 26 observe that 
"[t]he use of space weapons, with the capability to render massive destruction and injury (either 
directly or indirectly), may well violate the principles of proportionality". 
136  Su and Zhu 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 50-51. 
137  Su and Zhu 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 51. The authors refer to 
research indicating that "space debris in orbits higher than about 800 km above the Earth's surface 
will be up there for decades, above 1,000 km for centuries, and above 1,500 km effectively forever. 
… The last few decades have witnessed dramatic proliferation of space debris. Now over 21,000 
orbiting debris larger than 10 cm in diameter are tracked; and as estimated there are over 100,000 
pieces larger than a marble". Duberti 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 
85 regards space debris (for example, caused by the destruction of satellites) as one of the most 
important threats to space security. For a further discussion on the legal implications of space 
debris see Ferreira-Snyman 2013 CILSA 19-51. 
138  Su and Zhu 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 51. 
139  Filho 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 480, 482. Filho points out that 
in the area of outer space "[t]here is no clarity on how to use [self-defence], how to employ 
proportional means in the operation, how to reach a minimally fair outcome, and how to stop it" 
(Filho 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 480). 
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generis interpretation of article 51 in the context of outer space. The unique 
circumstances in outer space make it difficult to apply article 51 (which was formulated 
with reference to earth-based circumstances) in space. It is therefore suggested that 
peaceful uses of outer space should be interpreted to mean a prohibition on the use 
of all forms of force in outer space, similar to the prohibition in the Antarctic Treaty 
referred to earlier. 
It is doubtful, however, if states will be willing to merely waive their right to self-
defence in outer space. It is inconceivable that a state will not exercise this right in 
the event of an armed attack against its space assets (or even the threat of such an 
attack). The importance that states attach to this right is evident, for example, from 
the fact that the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects guarantees 
the right to self-defence by determining that nothing in the treaty "may be interpreted 
as impeding the exercise by the States Parties of their right of self-defence in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations".140 The right to self-
defence is even construed wider in the 2014 draft of the Treaty, which now makes 
provision for both the right to individual and collective self-defence by the states 
parties.141 
Because of the difficulties in reaching international consensus on the military uses of 
outer space (including issues such as self-defence), it is proposed that as an interim 
measure the United Nations Security Council should adopt a binding resolution in this 
regard. The increasing potential for conflict concerning the security of space assets, 
and the consequent weaponisation of outer space, is becoming a real concern. The 
result will inevitably be "a less secure outer space"142 with serious implications for the 
                                        
140  A V of the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2008). The fifth revised Draft International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2014) proposed by the European Union, also 
guarantees the inherent right of states to individual and collective self-defence as recognised in a 
26 of the UN Charter. The text of the revised Code is available at Reaching Critical Will 2014 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space. 
141  A IV of the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2008) now reads as follows: "The Treaty shall 
by no means affect the State's Parties inherent right to individual or collective self-defense, as 
recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter". 
142  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 362. 
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freedom of all states (including future generations) to use and explore outer space. 
Moreover, the conflict will in all probability not be confined to outer space, but may 
escalate to earth-based armed conflict, which will be a serious threat to international 
peace and security. In order to avoid this, the Security Council should adopt a 
resolution in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter to reaffirm the prohibition of all forms 
of armed conflict in outer space (including the use of self-defence).143 
The adoption of such a resolution will inevitably depend on the political will especially 
of the major space powers such as the United States, Russia and China. It is 
encouraging to note, however, that specifically Russia and China have in the past 
supported the prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space.144 As early as 
in the 1980s Russia (as the then Soviet Union) made specific proposals to the United 
Nations General Assembly on the banning of space weapons (including earth-based 
weapons targeting space) in order to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the 
prohibition of the use of force in outer space.145 On its part, China in 2003 made a 
public declaration against the militarisation of space and calling for the use of space 
technologies for peaceful purposes.146 Yet in view of the current space policy of the 
USA which provides for the use of space weapons in support of its defence and 
national security objectives,147 it would be premature to regard these actions as 
reflecting the collective viewpoint of all the space powers.148 As pointed out here 
below, the motives of China and Russia for supporting the non-weaponisation of outer 
space are also questioned by some. 
4.3 Space weapon 
                                        
143  Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law points out that the United Nations should make a 
shift from its current strategy of issuing regular calls for the prevention of an armed race in space, 
to "the establishment of rigorously enforced moratorium on the deployment of weapons in outer 
space, which might offer a window of opportunity to negotiate a total ban of weapons in outer 
space. Naturally, this would require a significant shift in political will among the major space-faring 
nations, which although a difficult task, should be encouraged through negotiation and broader 
political pressure". 
144  Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 26-28. 
145  Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 26-27. 
146  Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 27-28. 
147  Gertz 2014 http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-opposes-new-draft-treaty-from-china-
and-russia-banning-space-weapons/. 
148  As Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 28 point out "the future of space security will 
depend on how effectively all States strive for the 'de-weaponization' of outer space and pressure 
the major space-faring nations, and how those nations are able to set aside their differences". 
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Although it is generally accepted that the weaponisation of outer space should be 
regarded as unlawful, the meaning of the term "space weapon" is not defined in any 
of the current space treaties, nor in any domestic legislation.149 If a broad approach 
is followed, a space weapon would include any "space and terrestrial-based systems 
capable of destroying, damaging or interfering with space assets".150 In contrast, a 
narrower definition would limit a space weapon to "space systems whose specific goal 
it is to destroy and damage an object in space".151 
However, as was already mentioned above, most space equipment has a dual purpose 
– both civilian and military. As a result, most space objects designed to be used for 
peaceful purposes in outer space have the potential to become space weapons and 
destroy or damage other active space systems.152 This ambiguity is further highlighted 
by the strategy to place weapons temporarily in orbit for a limited number of days or 
weeks, or to use technologies that merely disrupt the space activities of other space 
actors, for example, by using passive measures such as encryption and earth-based 
jamming.153 
Tronchetti154 therefore proposes a broad definition of the term space weapon as: 
                                        
149  Soucek "International Law" 363; Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 882. Duberti 2011 Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 81 identifies the following types of space weapons: 
electromagnetic and radiation weapons; kinetic energy and hypervelocity weapons and directed 
energy weapons. 
150  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 363-364. Own emphasis. Duberti 2011 Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 81 refers to the following broad definition of a space weapon: 
"[A] device stationed in outer space, (including the moon and other celestial bodies) or in the 
Earth's environment designed to destroy, damage or otherwise interference [sic] with the normal 
functioning of an object or being in outer space, or being in the earth environment". Duberti 
favours a broad definition of the term space weapon as this includes anti-satellite weapons 
(ASATs). 
151  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364. Own emphasis. Su 2010 Journal of Space Law seemingly 
refers to this narrower definition when he states that "[t]echnically, ground-based weapons 
targeting outer space objects are not placed in outer space; hence, they are not considered as 
part of the weaponization of outer space". 
152  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364. Lyall and Larsen Space Law 516-517 states in this regard as 
follows: "Military satellites are permitted, and in practice some of these may be 'active' weapons. 
This could include the kinetic, laser and radio possibilities that might be used in anti-satellite 
measures (ASATs)." 
153  Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 883. 
154  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364. 
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[a]ny device, whether in space or on Earth, created or modified to cause permanent 
or temporary physical or operational damage to an object in outer space by means 
of physical contact, projection of energy, or any kind of voluntary interference.155 
Although the advantage of this definition is that it is broad enough to include both 
space and earth-based systems, and that it refers to the destruction as well as the 
temporary inoperability of space objects as a result of an attack,156 it is not clear 
whether it refers only to devices which have the specific purpose of being used as a 
weapon or whether it also includes a space object which has the potential to cause 
damage to assets in outer space. 
An attempt to provide a treaty-based definition of the term "space weapon" may be 
found in the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.157 The 
draft document defines a "space weapon" as 
any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has 
been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the 
normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth's 
atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere 
which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them …158 
Several concerns have been raised with the Draft Treaty, however, including the 
following.159 The draft document does not explicitly prohibit the testing and 
development of anti-satellite weapons, but allows for their research, development, 
production and terrestrial storage. Only the threat or use of such weapons against 
space objects for hostile purposes is prohibited.160 The Draft Treaty thus places the 
emphasis only on space-based weapons. As a result, dual-use systems, which are not 
specifically produced to destroy space-objects, do not fall within the Draft Treaty's 
definition of a "space weapon".161 
                                        
155  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364. 
156  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364. 
157  A I(c) of the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of 
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2008). 
158  A I of the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2008). 
159  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 370-371. 
160  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 370. 
161  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 371. 
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The definition of a "space weapon" has not been significantly amended in the 2014 
Draft Treaty. Article 1(b) now reads as follows: 
[T]he term "weapon in outer space" means any outer space object or its component 
produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal functioning of objects 
in outer space, on the Earth's surface or in the air, as well as to eliminate population, 
components of biosphere important to human existence, or to inflict damage to them 
by using any principles of physics. 
It seems that the revised definition is not much more than a grammatical revision of 
the 2008 version and thus still does not address the concerns pointed out here above. 
One notable change in the 2014 version of article 1(b) is the use of the term "outer 
space object"; instead of "device" in its description of a space weapon. However, the 
definition of an "outer space object" in the revised article 1(a) is much more concise 
and arguably vaguer than its 2008 counterpart,162 and reads as follows: 
[T]he term "outer space object" means any device placed in outer space and 
designed for operating therein.163 
This vagueness is exacerbated by the fact that a definition for "outer space" has been 
omitted from the revised Draft Treaty. 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty makes no mention of conventional weapons or 
any other military systems, but specifically prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, or the placement of such 
weapons on celestial bodies. This is most probably due to the preoccupation of states 
with the dangers of radioactive fallout caused by nuclear tests and the development 
and use of nuclear weapons at the time of the negotiating of the treaty, when the use 
of conventional weapons in outer space was not foreseen.164 It is thus not clear 
whether the lack of an explicit prohibition on the use of conventional weapons in outer 
                                        
162  In the of the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of 
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2008) the term "outer space object" is 
defined as "any device, designed for functioning in outer space, being launched into an orbit 
around any celestial body, or being in the orbit around any celestial body, or on any celestial body 
except the Earth, or leaving the orbit around any celestial body towards this celestial body, or 
moving from any celestial body towards another celestial body, or placed in outer space by any 
other means …". 
163  The definition of a "space object" in a 1(d) of the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (1972) is equally vague. It defines a "space object" as including the 
"component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof". 
164  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 513-514; Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 267. 
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space suggests that the use of such weapons is implicitly permitted.165 In this regard, 
Bourbonnière and Lee166 argue that the deployment of conventional weapons in earth 
orbit for peace-keeping purposes under articles VI and VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations will be permissible under article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. 
In contrast with nuclear weapons, which are "a defined technology", the legal meaning 
of the term weapons of mass destruction (which may include radiological, biological 
and chemical weapons)167 within the context of the Outer Space Treaty, is not clear.168 
In addition, the prohibition in article IV on the testing of any type of weapon 
specifically on celestial bodies may, according to some, imply that the prohibition does 
not apply to such tests in outer void space itself.169 Friman170 however, argues that in 
view of the title of the Outer Space Treaty and its preamble, which sets out the legal 
boundaries within which the treaty articles must operate, as well as the wording of 
articles IX and XI of the Outer Space Treaty,171 the prohibition on the non-peaceful 
uses of outer space should extend to outer void space. Moreover, as was already 
pointed out earlier, due to the generation of vast amounts of space debris, the mere 
testing of space weapons (irrespective of whether it is done on a celestial body or in 
outer void space) already poses a risk to space security and to the right of other states 
to use and explore outer space freely. 
Due to the explicit prohibition on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, 
it is widely accepted that the use of military support systems is not incompatible with 
the Outer Space Treaty.172 The use of nuclear power sources (which are often utilised 
                                        
165  See Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 267. 
166  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 888. 
167  See further Lyall and Larsen Space Law 515 for the attempts to define this term. 
168  Lyall and Larsen state that, although the specific legal content of the term is unclear, "[t]he basic 
element of the concept of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] appears to be … that a weapon of 
mass destruction indiscriminately kills a large number. Whether that is a large number of innocent 
persons or a large number of persons simpliciter (i.e. including military personnel) remains obscure 
…" (Lyall and Larsen Space Law 515 fn 76).  
169  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 517. Wilson 2001 LJIL 801 submits that states are allowed to use 
outer void space for a range of military purposes, excluding the stationing of nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction. 
170  Friman 2005 FYBIL 310. 
171  Friman 2005 FYBIL 307 points out that both aa IX and XI refers to the "peaceful exploration and 
use of outer space" and a IX clarifies that such peaceful exploration and use extends to outer void 
space by stating that outer space includes the moon and other celestial bodies.  
172  Soucek "International Law" 320. 
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by the USA and Russia) is also not prohibited.173 Also intercontinental ballistic missiles 
carrying nuclear warheads are not prohibited by the treaty, since they are not placed 
in (a full) orbit around the earth and therefore fall outside the prohibition in article 
IV.174 The ballistic missile defence shield developed by the United States to protect 
itself and its allies against missile attacks is, however, a more contentious issue, since 
the kinetic energy interceptors launched into space to destroy enemy missiles also 
have the potential to be used as anti-satellite weapons.175 
In dealing with the lacunae in article IV, some authors have suggested that, based on 
the reasoning of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus-case,176 it 
may be argued that what is not expressly prohibited under article IV, may be permitted 
in law.177 It is agreed with the submission by Su,178 however, that due to the grave 
consequences of the weaponisation of outer space (which could eventually lead to an 
arms race in outer space and even armed conflict on earth) the Lotus principle should 
not be applicable to outer space.179  
5 The way forward? 
After the conclusion of the space treaties in the 1960s and 1970s, it became apparent 
that states were no longer willing to adopt further binding obligations regulating space 
activities and that international space law could, therefore, be developed only by 
adopting soft law instruments.180 As a result of their non-mandatory character, these 
instruments are generally more easily negotiated by states than is the case with 
                                        
173  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 516. 
174  Soucek "International Law" 320; Filho 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space 
Law 478-479. In this regard Lyall and Larsen Space Law 519 explain as follows: "[b]allistic and 
anti-ballistic missiles remain a potential military use of space. However, ballistic missiles are not 
vehicles in Earth or other orbit although they may briefly intrude into space. This means, inter alia 
that ballistic missiles with nuclear or WMD warheads are not covered by the prohibition on the 
stationing of such weapons in space under OST Art. IV though other space treaties may apply." 
175  Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5448-outer-space. 
176  Lotus Case (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A, No 10. 
177  Bourbonnière and Lee 2007 EJIL 880. 
178  Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 271. 
179  Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 272 states that "[t]he lack of a specific prohibition does not mean 
space weaponization is permitted under international law. Relying on the Lotus principle would 
undermine the international legal framework and instigate a laissez-faire attitude in the 
international community". 
180  Tronchetti "Soft Law" 626; Tronchetti "A Soft Law Approach" 372. 
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treaties.181 Hence, soft law182 documents are currently the main instruments for 
further developing and defining outer space norms.183 
Proponents of a hard-law approach to prevent the weaponisation of outer space, 
however, maintain that the adoption of a legally binding treaty will be the most 
effective measure to ensure the non-weaponisation of outer space, as a violation of 
the treaty would make a state legally responsible towards the other states parties.184 
Notwithstanding the fact that most states are (theoretically) in agreement that the 
weaponisation of outer space should be prevented,185 all attempts to conclude a legally 
binding treaty prohibiting the placement and use of all kinds of weapons in outer space 
have, up to the present, been very challenging.186 The most recent attempt to achieve 
this, is the Russia/China Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons 
in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, 
submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 and 2014 referred to earlier. 
Although the Draft Treaty may be regarded as a point of departure in the formulation 
of a treaty prohibiting the weaponisation of outer space, the criticism that has been 
raised by governments against the draft document makes it unlikely that it would be 
easily accepted by the majority of states.187 The 2008 Draft Treaty was rejected by 
                                        
181  Tronchetti "Soft Law" 625-626. 
182  Dugard International Law 33 describes soft law as "imprecise standards, generated by declarations 
adopted by diplomatic conferences or resolutions of international organizations, that are intended 
to serve as guidelines to states in their conduct, but which lack the status of 'law'". Tronchetti 
"Soft Law" 624 summarises the role of soft law in the general system of international law as 
follows: "1) it can give guidance on how to interpret and implement existing treaty provisions; 2) 
it may represent the beginning of a process leading to an international treaty; 3) it may contribute 
to the formation of customary law; 4) it may be declaratory of existing unwritten rules." Klabbers 
Introduction to International Institutional Law 202 is of the opinion, however, that the concept 
soft law should be discarded mainly because it is premised on the jurisprudentially dubious notion 
that legal rules can be more or less binding, which is not really supported by international tribunals. 
Furthermore, the fact that soft law is often conceived as informal standards-setting without any 
control, makes it a convenient tool for the exercise of pure political power.  
183  Tronchetti "Soft Law" 627; Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 372. 
184  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 368. Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law propose in 
this regard that "[w]e must move towards the negotiation of a comprehensive international legal 
instrument addressing the issues of space weaponization, based on the accepted principle that 
space is the common heritage of mankind …". Also see Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 893. 
185  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 386. 
186  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 368-369. 
187  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 370-371. Su and Zhu 2011 Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Space Law 51 submit that, notwithstanding the criticism against the draft treaty, it 
provides a "constructive basis for a more solid space security regime", as it has been taken note 
of in a number of UN General Assembly resolutions. 
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the Bush administration from the onset inter alia by characterising it as an attempt by 
Russia and China to gain a military advantage, and the dismissal of the Draft Treaty 
has continued under the Obama administration.188 
After the revised draft of the Treaty was submitted by Russia and China to the 
Conference on Disarmament on 10 June 2014, Frank Rose, the US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, Arms Control, Verification and Compliance informed the Conference 
that the revised Draft Treaty fails to address "significant flaws" already identified in 
the 2008 version. According to Rose, some of the fundamental problems with the 2014 
Draft Treaty are the lack of an "effective verification regime to monitor compliance", 
and the fact that "terrestrially based anti-satellite systems posing the greatest and 
most imminent threat to space" are not covered by the Draft Treaty. A former 
Pentagon strategic analyst, Mike Schneider, has added that the serious definitional 
problems (such as that of a "space weapon") in the Draft Treaty have contributed to 
the United States' rejection of the Treaty.189 In addition, there also seems to be still 
some concern regarding Russia and China's motives with the Draft Treaty, which are 
considered by some observers as an attempt to limit their adversaries' military 
capabilities.190 
Due to the difficulties in creating a binding treaty, the appropriateness of soft law to 
prevent an arms race in outer space and to protect space assets is also increasingly 
supported in the area of space security.191 These soft law guidelines could be drafted 
in various forms, for example as guidelines or rules of the road, with the purpose of 
creating transparency in order to avoid "accidental military engagement in outer 
space",192 or as codes of conduct which provide certain behavioural and operational 
rules to be followed by states when conducting space activities,193 or as transparency 
                                        
188  Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-shhets/critical-issues/ 
5448-outer-space. 
189  Gertz 2014 http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-opposes-new-draft-treaty-from-china-
and-russia-banning-space-weapons/. 
190  See further Farnsworth 2014 http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_0708/News/Fate-of-Space-
Code-Remains-Unclear%20. 
191  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 372.  
192  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 529-530. 
193  For a discussion of some of these soft-law codes see Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 376-383. 
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and confidence-building measures (so-called TCBMs)194 with the purpose of sharing 
information on the location and scope of space launches and activities, among other 
things, or information on domestic space policies programmes, in order to improve 
international relations.195 In this regard Tronchetti196 submits as follows: 
First and utmost soft law provisions, and in particular TCBMs, are being recognised 
as a useful tool to enhance space security because they contribute to create mutual 
understanding and to reduce tensions among States. In particular, these measures 
diminish and even eliminate the cause for mistrust, fear and miscalculation 
concerning military activities in outer space and intentions of other States, factors 
which may generate the perception of an impaired security of national space objects 
and provide justification for the placement and use of weapons in outer space. 
The question obviously remains whether states will be willing to share such 
information, as the military use of outer space is usually closely linked to national 
security issues.197 
As with the non-binding space debris mitigation guidelines, it could be argued that 
soft law rules will have a moral and political value, as there is an expectation that 
states will comply with its provisions.198 Non-compliance may be viewed in a negative 
light by a state’s international partners and thus damage the political reputation of the 
state.199 Especially in instances where there is an urgent need for legal clarity, a soft 
law instrument offers a solution as it can be negotiated in a relatively short period of 
time and implemented immediately, because its applicability is not dependent on 
ratification by states.200 It could thus furthermore be argued that soft law guidelines 
have a legal value, as they impact on the international law-making process by 
providing the premise on which customary international law may develop, and which 
                                        
194  See further on TCBMs, Takaya-Umehara 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space 
Law 123-132; Kapustin 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 186-190; 
Gopalakrishan, Bhaskaranarayana and Murthi 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of 
Space Law 140-142. 
195  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 372. 
196  Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 373. 
197  In this regard Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 375 points out that, similarly, a state's decision to 
comply with a treaty is also influenced by security and strategic interests. Should a state deem a 
treaty to be no longer in its interest, it may breach the treaty and bear the consequences or if 
possible withdraw from it.  
198  See in the context of space debris mitigation, Welly 2010 Journal of Space Law 307; Tronchetti 
"Soft Law" 620. 
199  Welly 2010 Journal of Space Law 307. 
200  Tronchetti "Soft Law" 626. 
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may eventually lead to the conclusion of a binding treaty.201 In addition, propositions 
for the creation of an outer space inspection system or even a world space 
organisation to ensure the continued peaceful use of outer space should also be 
revisited.202 
The European Union's draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities203 is a good 
example of an attempt to regulate the military use of outer space by means of a soft-
law instrument. The Code, which will not be legally binding, aims to improve safety 
and security in outer space by means of principles and guidelines voluntarily agreed 
upon by states.204 A number of states, such as Australia, Canada and Japan, have 
already indicated their support for the Code. Also, the USA seems to be inclined to 
accept the Code due to its non-binding nature.205 However, some countries, including 
Brazil, Russia, India and China, have expressed concerns that the Code could be used 
as a means to constrain their capacity to undertake future space activities and that 
the language on self-defence in the Code could encourage an arms race in space. 
Specifically Brazil, India and some Latin-American countries have expressed their 
disappointment at not being consulted properly in the development of the Draft 
Code.206  
Apart from the obvious politically motivated difficulties and time-constraints involved 
in reaching an international agreement on the militarisation of outer space, it seems 
that there is divergent opinion amongst states on the correct forum where this issue 
should be addressed. While some countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and Russia have 
argued that the United Nations General Assembly is the appropriate body to debate 
and vote on the Draft Code of Conduct, the USA and some European Union member 
                                        
201  Tronchetti "Soft Law" 621; Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 375; Welly 2010 Journal of Space Law 
311. See further Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 373-376 for a discussion of the advantages of a 
soft-law approach. Also see Walter "Privatisation and Commercialisation of Outer Space" 503. 
202  Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 24. 
203  The fifth revised Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2014) was made 
public by the EU on 31 March 2014. Text available at Reaching Critical Will 2014 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space. 
204  Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/ 
5448-outer-space. 
205  Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/ 
5448-outer-space. 
206  Farnsworth 2014 http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_0708/News/Fate-of-Space-Code-
Remains-Unclear%20. 
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states have disputed the appropriateness of such negotiations within the realm of the 
United Nations.207 
In its 2013 Report208 the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNCOPUOS) states that the Committee agreed that due to its work in scientific, 
technical and legal fields, as well as its facilitation of international dialogue on issues 
relating to the exploration and use of outer space, "it had a fundamental role to play 
in ensuring that outer space was maintained for peaceful purposes".209 The view was 
furthermore expressed by some delegates that the Committee should commence with 
analysing the "legal basis for and modalities of the exercise of the right to self-defence 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as applied to outer space".210 
Some delegates submitted that the Committee was the only United Nations body 
aimed at promoting the peaceful use of outer space and therefore any concept that 
violated the legal principles relating to the peaceful use of outer space, such as the 
concept of the right to self-defence or the use of weapons in outer space, should not 
be accepted in the Committee, as this would be in contradiction of its fundamental 
tasks.211 
The view was further expressed that the current outer space legal regime was not 
adequate to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space and that, in order to 
ensure the peaceful use of outer space and prevent its militarisation, a binding legal 
instrument had to be prepared. While some delegates recommended that the 
Committee cooperate and coordinate in this regard with other United Nations bodies 
such as the Conference on Disarmament, others were of the opinion that it would be 
more appropriate if disarmament issues be dealt with exclusively in forums such as 
the Conference on Disarmament. One delegation even expressed the view that "no 
actions by the Committee were needed regarding the weaponisation of outer space 
                                        
207  Farnsworth 2014 http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_0708/News/Fate-of-Space-Code-
Remains-Unclear%20. 
208  Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 56th session (12-21 June 2013). 
209  Ch II para 36 of the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 56th session 
(12-21 June 2013). 
210  Ch II para 39 of the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 56th session 
(12-21 June 2013). 
211  Ch II para 41 of the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 56th session 
(12-21 June 2013). 
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and that there was no scarcity of appropriate multilateral mechanisms where 
disarmament could be discussed". Although it could be argued that a change in forum 
would not change the national stances of states, Park212 suggests that the creation of 
a new discussion forum on space security (that would include diplomats, academics, 
military officers and industry representatives) might place additional, unified pressure 
specifically on the USA to change its position on space security and the weaponisation 
of outer space. 
6 Conclusion 
It should be apparent from the above exposition that article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty cannot adequately deal with the current issues relating to the military use of 
outer space. The legal vacuum in this area may have grave consequences for 
maintaining peace and security not only in outer space but also on earth.213 The legal 
uncertainty surrounding the military use of outer space is further exacerbated by the 
lack of coordination in relation to arms control initiatives. Apart from the Draft EU 
Code of Conduct and the Russia/China Draft Treaty, there are currently a number of 
individual UN initiatives in this regard, such as the Group of Government Experts on 
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, the United 
Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the standing debate on the 
prevention of an arms race in outer space within the Conference on Disarmament.214 
It is therefore imperative that an international dialogue on the military use of outer 
space is facilitated under the auspices of a consolidated forum to address the legal 
uncertainties which may impair the peaceful use of outer space. It is submitted that 
since the UNCOPUOS has been specifically established to address issues relating to 
outer space, it is best suited to address the military use of outer space. Due to the 
                                        
212  Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 906-907. Park refers to a statement by a representative of the US State 
Department in 2002, that a change in venues "would not change national positions. States would 
still have the same concerns that they have in existing fora" (Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 906). 
213  This is supported by the General Assembly Resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 
Space A/RES/62/20 (10 January 2008) which recognises that the "prevention of an arms race in 
outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security". 
214  Farnsworth 2014 http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_0708/News/Fate-of-Space-Code-
Remains-Unclear%20. 
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unique nature of outer space issues, they should not be dealt with in a forum which 
primarily focuses on earth-based situations.  
Although it is agreed with the proponents of a hard law approach that a legally binding 
instrument should be adopted to regulate the military use of outer space, it is 
submitted that, as an interim measure, soft law guidelines should be developed to 
provide a framework for the eventual creation of a consolidated and binding legal 
instrument on all aspects relating to the use of outer space. In this regard the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea could serve as a valuable example.215 
As Lyall and Larsen216 observe: 
Once one state begins to assert unilateral authority to weaponise outer space with 
the implicit threat of the use of those weapons, other states will use that precedent 
to assert their own unilateral authority.  
Should this happen, the "point of no return" referred to by President Eisenhower in 
1960 may be reached much sooner than anticipated. 
                                        
215  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
216  Lyall and Larsen Space Law 532. 
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